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CASE LAW AND SOCIAL WELFARE:
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
Jan L. Hagen
Lecturer, School of Social Work
University of Minnesota
ABSTRACT
This paper illustrates an approach for analyzing case law within the
framework of social welfare programs and policies. Drawing on a
framework first developed by Burns and later expanded by Gilbert and
Specht, selected court decisions related to income maintenance are
categorized on the basis of four parameters: basis of social alloca-
tion, the nature of social provisions, the structure of the delivery
system, and the method of financing. Unlike the legal framework
typically used to analyze court decisions, an assessment of court de-
cisions along the parameters of social welfare policies and programs
highlights the court's role and its importance in social welfare
policy.
INTRODUCTION
Although much narrower in scope than statutes or administrative rules
and regulations, decisions made by the judicial branch of government
frequently have a significant impact upon the provision of services
and benefits by social welfare institutions. Given the implications
of some of these decisions in terms of eligibility criteria, adequacy
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of benefits, and procedural restrictions, it is appropriate that a
model be developed for the analysis of court decisions within the con-
text of social welfare policy. The legal frameworks typically used
to analyze court decisions related to welfare law generally emphasize
the constitutional parameters, the impact of case law on the structure
of federal-state relations, and a case-by-case analysis of eligibility
conditions and benefit entitlement. Framing the analysis of court
decisions around the parameters of social welfare policies and programs
may enhance understanding of judicial decisions and their applications.
Such an approach for analyzing case law within the framework of social
welfare programs and policies is illustrated in this paper through the
application of an analytic framework to selected court cases. Drawing
on a framework first developed by Eveline Burns (1946) and later re-
fined by Gilbert and Specht (1974), court decisions related to income
maintenance programs and policies are categorized on the basis of four
parameters: the basis of social allocation; the nature of social provi-
sions; the structure of the delivery service; and the method of financ-
ing (see table 1). This process helps to specify the usefulness of the
model as well as to identify limitations in its application. By assess-
ing court decisions along these four parameters, one measure of the
court's role and its importance in social welfare is provided.
MODEL
Although components of this model have been used by others such as Rein
(1970), Titmuss (1968), and Kahn (1969), the original and most elaborate
application of the model was done by Eveline Burns (1946) in her classic
analysis of the social security program. She specifically dealt with
decisions that are made about the nature and amount of benefits, eligi-
bility conditions, risks covered, financing structure, and administrative
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structure. Gilbert and Specht have adapted this model and further
clarified the options and the underlying value systems of each
component within the framework. The framework places social
welfare policy "in the context of a benefit-allocation mechanism
functioning outside the marketplace" (Gilbert and Specht, 1974,
p. 28). The central concern is the plausible alternatives within
social welfare policy or, as they prefer to call it, the dimensions
of choice. (Table 1 highlights the components of each dimension.)
Given its comprehensiveness and wide range of application, this
framework is a useful one for analyzing judicial decisions related
to social welfare, particularly income maintenance.
APPLICATION OF THE MODEL
To illustrate the use of the model in analyzing judicial decisions,
selected court decisions related to income maintenance programs are
discussed within the framework of the dimensions of choice.
Basis of Social Allocation
Within the social allocation dimension, the U.S. Supreme Court has
set limits on eligibility conditions imposed by the states, distin-
guished between recipients of means tested and attributed need
programs, fostered the concept of social integration, and affirmed
the use of work requirements in income maintenance programs.
For example, in 1976, the Court was asked in Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, what procedures were necessary prior to the initial
termination of disability insurance benefits. The Social Security
-410-
Administration terminated disability benefits without the beneficiary
being provided with an evidentiary hearing prior to that termination.
The beneficiary was, however, informed by the state agency that he
might request additional time to submit additional information
pertaining to his condition and later, by the Social Security
Administration that he could seek reconsideration within six
months. Legally, the issue before the Court was clearly one
of due process; specifically, what procedural safeguards were
necessary tosatisfy the due process requirement of the consti-
tution. A previous ruling in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970), had indicated that a hearing prior to termination was
an essential part of procedural due process. However, the Court
noted in this case that a disabled workers' need is likely to be
less than a welfare recipient's and that other sources of potential
temporary income are available to disabled workers. In justifying
its position that less than an evidentiary hearing was sufficient
prior to the termination of benefits, the Court discussed at length
the issue of cost effectiveness:
Financial cost alone is not a controlling
weight in determining whether due process
requires a particular procedural safeguard
prior to some administrative decision. But
the Government's interest, and hence that of
the public, in conserving scarce fiscal and
administrative resources, is a factor that
must be weighed. At some point the benefit
of an additional safeguard to the individual
affected by the administrative action and to
society in terms of increased assurance that
the action is just, may be outweigh by the
cost (96 S. Ct. at 909).
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In arriving at its decision, the Court clearly distinguished between
recipients of a program which is means tested and one in which the
need for benefits is assumed. In this decision, then, the Court
addressed the issues of cost effectiveness and the allocative
principles of means tested need and attributed need. This latter
distinction seems to imply two separate systems for procedural
due process in income maintenance programs.
If one measure of social integration is the ability of a society's
members to move freely within that society, then the Court has twice
acted to uphold the principle of social integration. In the first
instance, The People of California v. Edwards, 314 U.S. 160 (1941),
a California statute making it a misdemeanor to bring or assist in
bringing a non-resident indigent person, knowing him to be indigent,
into the state was challenged. The state attempted to justify its
statute on the basis of the tradition of the English poor laws.
However, the Court held that the state could not restrict the
transportation of indigent persons across its boundaries because
it interferred with interstate commerce, the regulation of which
is reserved by the constitution to Congress. This decision threw
into question the constitutionality of the state durational
residency requirements which was not settled until 1969. In
Shapiro v. Thompson,394 U.S. 618 (1969), the Court held that
the durational residency requirements denied equal protection
of the law under the constitution by restricting the right to
interstate travel.
The issue of work incentives has also been addressed by the Court.
In Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973), the major question before the
Court was whether federal work incentive requirements prevented
the states from having more stringent work requirements. Legally, the
issue before the Court was one of federal preemption, a doctrine which
makes state laws in a particular area invalid if Congress has demon-
strated a clear intent to regulate the entire area through its own
legislation (Hill, Mossen, and Sogg, 1976, p. 23). Although the
Court required that the New York Work Rules be examined to see
if they conflicted with the federal work incentive requirements,
it did not accept the argument that the federal laws had preempted
the field for work requirements.
Nature of Social Provisions
As might be expected, the Court has had little to say about the
various forms of social provisions. Determining the form of social
provisions rests with the legislative branch of government. However,
the Court had to address the use of vendor payments in Engleman v.
Amos, 404 U.S. 23 (1971). The use of vendor payments rather than
cash seriously compromises the concept of consumer sovereignty and
introduces an element of social control into the provision of bene-
fits. In Engleman, a New Jersey regulation which allowed the state
to make vendor payments under its welfare statutes was challenged
as being in conflict with the Social Security Act. The Court held
that states were not prohibited from using vendor payments as long
as no federal matching funds were involved. Whether or not such
payments violated constitutional or statutory conditions was not
addressed. Protective payments, which also compromise consumer
sovereignty, have been challenged as well. Thus far, protective
payments have been upheld as constitutional (Hodges v. Weinberger,
429 F. Supp. 756, 1977). In general, it would appear that pro-
tective payments and payments to vendors are permissible forms of
social provisions.
Delivery System
Most of the court cases involving the delivery system for income main-
tenance programs are concerned with the pattern of authority between
the state and federal governments. A significant decision in 1923
helped set the pattern of state-federal cooperation that has been
so prevalent. That decision also provided the transition from
viewing welfare as a local concern to a national concern. In
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), the constitutionality
of the 1921 Maternity and Infancy Act (Sheppard-Towner Act) was
challenged. This act, aimed at reducing maternal and infant
mortality and at protecting maternal and infant health, was
one of the first attempts at federal and state cooperation in
social welfare. Because the states were given the option of
participating in the program, the Court held that the states'
powers were not in question and that, indeed, the alleviation
of poverty was permissible national objective (La France, 1979,
p. 9). This decision opened the door for further federal govern-
ment activity in the area of social welfare.
The following case illustrates the legal issue of the supremacy
of federal law. In terms of the framework used here, the issue
becomes which level of government has authority. King v. Smith,
292 U.S. 309 (1968), raised the issue of the use of a "substitute
father" regulation in Alabama which denied AFDC payments to
children of mothers who "cohabit" with a man, either inside
or outside her home. The Court held that this was unacceptable
as a condition of eligibility. It clearly indicated that states
must conform to the eligibility criteria set forth by Congress
and that this criteria was essentially financial for a federally
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funded program. The states, however, retain a great amount of dis-
cretion in determining the level of financial benefits and the method
of computation.
In Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970), the method of determining the
need standard for recipients was challenged. The question before
the court was whether states were required to adjust AFDC benefits
to meet the cost of living. The Court held that, although the state
had to update the standard of need to the 1969 level, the state was
still free to use benefit reductions and to pay inadequate benefits.
In the Townsend case, 404 U.S. 282 (1971), an Illinois procedure of
limiting AFDC funds todependent children enrolled invocational training
was challenged. Congress had specifically provided that AFDC funds
were to be available to dependent childrenuntil age 20 if enrolled
in vocational training or college. In effect, the state policy was
encouraging vocational education and attempting to conserve funds.
The Court held that the Illinois policy was in clear conflict with
congressional legislation.
The patterns of authority have also been at issue in cases based on
equal protection challenges. For example, in Jefferson v. Hackney,
406 U.S. 535 (1971), the Texas system for computing financial need
was challenged. At that time, Texas used a percentage reduction
of the level of need before outside income was deducted and the
percentage reduction varied for each category of aid (e.g., Aid to
the Blind, Aid to the Aged, and AFDC). Both of these practices were
challenged: the former on the basis of obscuring actual need; the
latter on the basis of discrimination because a higher percentage
of need was paid to the adult programs than to the program for
dependent children. The Court rejected these challenges thus leaving
states considerable latitude in the area of financial allocations.
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In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), a Maryland procedure
which restricted the total amount of benefits any one family could
receive under AFDC was challenged on the basis of conflicting with
the Social Security Act as well as denial of equal protection. The
Court did not uphold these challenges. But interestingly, in its
opinion, the Court found it necessary to address the procedure:
We do not decide today that the Maryland
regulation is wise, that it best fulfills
the relevant social and economic object-
ives that Maryland might ideally espouse,
or that a more just and humane system
could not be devised. Conflicting
claims of morality and intelligence
are raised by opponents and propo-
nents of almost every measure, cer-
tainly including the one before us.
But the intractable economic, social
and even philosophical problems
presented by public welfare assis-
tance programs are not the business
of this Court.. .The Constitution
does not empower this Court to
second-guess state officials charged
with the difficult responsibility of
allocating limited public welfare
funds among the myriad of potential
recipients (397 U.S. at 487).
If access to the delivery system includes the procedures which must
be adhered to in terminating benefits, the 1969 decision in Goldberg
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v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, has significant implications for administra-
tive discretion. The legal issue before the Court was one of due
process. The specific question dealt with the right of AFDC
recipients to an evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of
benefits. The Court held that for the termination of welfare bene-
fits, only a pre-termination evidentiary hearing assures the reci-
pient of procedural due process. The Court made clear that it
was concerned with depriving an eligible welfare recipient of those
benefits which are essential to the recipient for his livelihood.
The Court found it necessary to address the issue of cost effective-
ness. However, in this instance, it was the Court's thinking that
the interest of the recipient in the continuation of benefits and
the state's interest in not erroneously terminating benefits
outweighed concerns about increased financial and administrative
costs in implementing these due process procedures.
Financing
The final dimension to be considered is the method of financing for
social welfare programs. The source of funding for social welfare
programs has been of particular concern. Building on the cooperative
system established by the Maternity and Infancy of 1921 and the Court's
ruling in Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), which implied
that the alleviation of poverty was a permissible federal concern,
the Social Security Act of 1935 broadened the scope and funding
of social welfare programs. The taxing mechanisms set up to
finance the programs were challenged as being unconstitutional;
they were viewed as interfering with the taxing powers of the states.
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In Steward Machine Company v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), the Court
held that the tax imposed on employers (for which they were given
credit if the employers made contributions to a state unemployment
fund) was not in violation of the constitution (the Tenth Amendment)
because states were not compelled to participate in the program.
A companion case, Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937), challenged
the provision for retirement benefits through taxation of employers
and employees. The Court held that this provision did not violate
the constitution (the Tenth Amendment) either. These decisions
clearly established the federal government's right to tax for
the general welfare.
An interesting lower court case held that welfare could be treated as
a matter of local concern by the state. In Lindsay v. Wyman, 372
F. Supp. 1360 (1974), the Mayor of New York City challenged a
New York State plan which would distribute the costs of welfare
among the localities in proportion to the number of recipients.
It was argued that this was an unfair burden on the City of New
York because it has a disproportionate share of the poor popu-
lation. However, the Court held that, even though poverty was a
national problem, it was also a local one and reasonable for the
locality to be responsible for the funding of social welfare programs.
DISCUSSION
As can be seen from the summary of court cases in Table 2, legal chal-
lenges to social welfare legislation and procedures arise from a
limited number of issues. Although legislation and procedures have
been challenged on various grounds, most challenges arise from three
concerns: due process, equal protection, and supremacy of either
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federal legislation or the constitution. Thus, the impact of court
decisions is fairly well limited to questions of eligibility, federal-
state conflicts, and program procedures.
In analyzing court decisions within the Gilbert and Specht framework,
it becomes obvious that the Court has played a strong role in defining
and clarifying the patterns of authority within the programs and
methods of financing social welfare programs. (See Table 3.) The
Court, however, has had limited impact on such issues as inadequate
benefits and inequities among the states. Given the restrictions
on legal challenges, changes in these areas may be beyond the
scope of the courtroom. It would appear that legislative action
on the federal and state level as well as administrative regulations
must be relied upon to address these concerns. Application of
the Gilbert and Specht framework points up the limitations of
case law and litigation as vehicles for changing social welfare
programs and policies. The framework is limited, however, in
its inattention to the methods by which policies and programs
are implemented, particularly in light of due process and equal
protection concerns.
The framework's utility in the analysis of court cases rests on its
ability to place court decisions within the perspective of the plau-
sible alternatives to social welfare policies and programs. Applying
the framework to court decisions readily identifies the areas in
which those decisions have influence as well as the boundaries
of those decisions. In addition, application of the framework
clarifies the possible implications of those decisions for
current programs and policies. The framework may also be used
to identify current concerns which may be amenable to change through
litigation. In a complementary fashion, the framework delineates
those areas in which social action or advocacy may be a more
appropriate strategy in attempting to bring about change in
social welfare programs and policies.
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TABLE 1
Dimensions of Social Welfare Policies and Programs
and Their Components
Dimensions Components
Basis of Social Allocation Universal v. Selective
Social Effectiveness v. Cost
Effectiveness
Incentives to work
Incentives to procreate
Stigmatization
Social integration
Institutional v. Residual
Allocative Principles
Attributed need
Compensation
Diagnositc differentiation
Means tested
Nature of Social Provisions Cash
In-kind
Opportunities
Services
Credits
Power
Values: Social control v.
Consumer sovereignty
Variable of Poverty Theories
Resource deficiency
Individual deficiency
Institutional deficiency
Structure of Delivery System Patterns of authority
Roles and status
Substantive composition
Mode of Financing Source of funds
System of transfer
Based on Neil Gilbert and Harry Specht, Dimensions of Social Welfare
Policy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974 .
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TABLE 2
Constitutional Issues and Associated Court Cases
Related to Income Maintenance
Constitutional Issue Court Cases
Doctrine of Preemption New York Departnent of
5ocial ger'rces v. Dublino
Due Process Goldberg v. KellY (1970)
Mathews v. Eldridge (1976)
Roberts v. Harder (1970)
Wyman v. James (1971)
Equal Protection Dandridge v. Williams (1970)
ZeTrerson v. Hackne (1971)
Lindsay v. Wyman (1974)
Shapiro v. Thomoson (1969)
Interstate Commerce The People of California
v. Edwards (1941)
States' Powers Engleman v. Amos (1971)
Helvering v. Davis (1937)
Massachusetts v. Mellon (1923)
Steward Machine v. Davis (1937)
Supremacy King v. Smith (1968)
Rosado v. Wyman (1970)
Shapiro v. Thompson (1969)
Townsend v. Swank (1971)
Unlawful Search Parrish v. Civil Service Com-
mission (1967)
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TABLE 3
Dimensions of Chc'ice and Associated Court Cases
Related tO Income Maintenance
Dimension Court Cases
Basis of Social Allocation King v. Smith (1968)
Mathews v. Edridge (1976)
New York Department of
Social Services v. Dulbino
(1973)
The Peonle of California v.
Edwards (1941)
iihapro v. Thompson (1969)
Nature of Social Provisions Engleman v. Amos (1971)
Roberts v. Ha-r-Mr (1970)
Structure of Delivery System Dandridge v. Williams (1970)
UOldberg v. Kelly (1970)
fferson v.Hacskney (1971)
Ein v. Smith (8)
Massachusetts v. Mellon (1923)
New York Department of
Social Servics v. Dulbino
(1973)
Parrish v. Civil ServiceUo-msson 1-967)
The People of California v.
Edwards (1941)
Rosa v. Wyman (1970)
Shapiro v. Tho so (1969)
Townsend v. Swank (1971)
Mode of Financing Helvering v. Davis (1937)'
Lindsay v. Wyman (1974)
Massachusetts v. Mellon (1923)
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis
(1937)
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